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Abstract 
 
 
The “Kyoto Protocol”, as the first and only implementation mechanism 
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), will 
expire by the year 2012. There are, however, many good reasons not to 
abandon this multilateral approach to climate change, but to soon go for a 
new round – “Kyoto II”. 
In doing so, the treaty must be thoroughly scrutinized for its deficiencies, as 
regards targets, instruments, and institutions. Particularly, and for various 
reasons, the Kyoto Protocol which is predominantly an economic concept 
should be supplemented by a technological companion - the “Houston 
Protocol” - under the UN Climate Convention. 
This paper shows how such an innovative “double strategy” of future 
climate policy might look like.   
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“Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for people around the 
world – access to water, food production, health, and use of land and the 
environment”.   
Sir Nicholas Stern   
1 Climate Change and Climate Policy   
The symposium addresses a real challenge – climate change – which 
needs compelling answers – climate policy. When writing the manuscript, 
the timing of this lecture seemed to be just perfect: roughly seven month 
after the publication of the German version of the 30-Year Update of “Limits 
to Growth” (September 2006), six months after the presentation of the 
“Stern-Report” (30th October, 2006), thirteen weeks after the presentation 
of the first part of the 4th Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (2nd February, 2007), five weeks after the second part 
(6th April, 2007) – and just one week before the third and last part (3rd 
May, 2007)!   
Meadows et al. made it clear, that climate change is just one of those limits 
the world has already overshot; Stern et al. presented a dramatic 
estimation of the economic costs of climate change; Working Group I of the 
IPCC reported on the scope of climate change, and Working Group II on 
the impacts and vulnerabilities. And now, with the report of Working Group 
III, we will be told what can be done to address the problem – i.e., what 
policies can or should be used to adapt to climate change and to prevent 
dangerous climate change.   
What was not foreseeable for the organisers of this conference was 
whether or not my views on climate politics would be in harmony or in 
conflict with the views of the IPCC. Well, there is probably both: consent 
and rejection.   
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2 Climate Change 2007: Physical Science Basis   
Let’s start with some basic facts. The 3rd IPCC Assessment Report of 2001 
already set the tone; the 4th Report of 2007 strengthens it with ‘very high 
confidence’: “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal”.   
The updated 100-year linear trend (1906-2005) is at plus 0.74 °C. The 
warming trend over the last 50 years is nearly twice that of the last 100 
years. Eleven of the last twelve years rank among the 12 warmest years in 
the instrumental record of global surface temperature, since 1850.   
Observations (continuously since 1961) show that the average temperature 
of the global ocean has also increased, to depths of at least 3000 meters. 
Such warming causes seawater to expand, contributing (with ‘high 
confidence’) to sea level rise for the total 20th century of some 17 cm.   
At continental, regional, and ocean basin scales, numerous specific long-
term changes in climate have been observed. These include changes in 
Arctic temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, 
ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather including 
droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of tropical 
cyclones, of typhoons and hurricanes.   
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Figure 1: Changes in Temperature, Sea Level and Snow Cover, 1850 - 2000   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IPCC, WG I, 2007.   
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Changes in the atmospheric abundance of greenhouse gases and 
aerosols, in solar radiation and in land surface properties alter the energy 
balance of the climate system. These changes are expressed in units of 
“radiative forcing” - a term used to compare how a range of human and 
natural factors drive warming or cooling influences on global climate. In 
recent years, new observations and related computer-modelling have led to 
improvements in the quantitative estimates of such radiative forcing.   
The report of Working Group I of IPCC says that by far the largest part of 
global warming is (‘very likely’) caused by human activities, particularly by 
the emission of various greenhouse gases.   
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important greenhouse gas. Its global 
atmospheric concentration has increased from a pre-industrial value of 
about 280 ppm (parts per million) to 379 ppm in 2005. This exceeds by far 
the natural range over the last 650.000 years, as determined from ice 
cores.   
The increased atmospheric concentration of CO2 results primarily from 
fossil fuel use, with land use change providing another significant but 
smaller contribution. Between 2000 and 2005, annual fossil fuel carbon 
dioxide emissions have increased to 26,4 Gigatons, while emissions 
associated with land-use change (agriculture and deforestation) were in the 
order of 5,9 Gt CO2.   
The second most important greenhouse gas is methane (CH4) which has 
increased from a pre-industrial value of about 715 ppb (parts per billion) to 
1774 ppb in 2005. It is ‘very likely’ that the observed increase in methane 
concentration is due to anthropogenic activities, predominantly agriculture 
and fossil fuel use.   
There is, third, nitrous oxide (NOx), the atmospheric concentration of which 
has increased from a pre-industrial value of about 270 ppb to 319 ppb in 
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2005. More than a third of all nitrous oxide emissions are anthropogenic, 
and primarily due to agricultural activities.   
Analysis of climate models together with evidence from observations 
enables an assessed range to be given to “climate sensitivity”. Equilibrium 
climate sensitivity is defined as the global average surface warming 
following a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations. Regarding a 
doubling from a pre-industrial level of 280 ppm to a future 560 ppm level, it 
is ‘likely’ to be in the range of 2 to 4,5 °C, with a best estimate of 3 °C. The 
amount of further warming thus is dependent on the assumptions made 
about future emissions of greenhouse gases.   
It is here, where the specific IPCC scenario methodology comes in. Model 
simulations cover a wide range of possible futures, including idealised 
emission and/or concentration assumptions.   
Working Group I of IPCC presents six such scenarios (based on the IPCC 
Special Report on Emission Scenarios – SRES): three scenarios of 
category A1 – i.e., the fossil-intensive A1FI, the non-fossil energy sources 
A1T, and a balance across all sources A1B - and the scenarios A2, B1 and 
B2 – corresponding to CO2 equivalent concentrations of 600, 700, 800, 
850, 1250 and 1550 ppm, respectively.   
(Scenarios B1 (600 ppm), A1B (850 ppm) and A2 (1250 ppm) have been 
the focus of model inter-comparison studies, and many of those results are 
assessed in the IPCC report).   
It’s interesting to note that the SRES scenarios do not include additional 
climate policy initiatives, which means that no scenarios are included that 
explicitly assume implementation of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) or of the emission targets of the Kyoto 
Protocol.   
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What then are the results of the simulations? Depending upon the scenario 
taken, the range of further global warming up to the year 2100 (over 2000) 
is between 1.1 and 6.4 °C.   
The best estimate for the low scenario (B1) is 1.8 °C (likely range is 1.1 – 
2.9 °C). This scenario describes a world with increasing population that 
peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, with rapid change in 
economic structures, reductions in material intensity, and introduction of 
clean and resource efficient technologies.   
The best estimate for the high scenario (A1FI) is 4.0 °C (likely range is 2.4 
– 6.4 °C). This scenario describes a world of very rapid economic growth, 
where the path of using fossil fuels is not being abandoned.   
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Figure 2: Global averages of surface warming (relative to 1980-1999) for 
scenarios A2, A1B and B1   
 
 
 
Source: IPCC, WG I, 2007.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 4
3 Climate Change 2007: Impacts and Vulnerabilities 
What then are the foreseeable impacts of climate change?  Working Group 
II of IPCC relates its assessment on the results of Working Group I, 
especially on the more than 29,000 observational data series, from 75 
studies, which show significant change in many physical and biological 
systems, a synthesis of studies and several modelling studies that have 
linked natural and anthropogenic factors.  In this way, additional information 
on the possible future impacts of climate change emerged.   
Working Group II presents the key findings regarding projected impacts in 
two major ways: with a view on sectors and a view on regions. Only an 
abridged version of the great number and the complexity of the impacts can 
be quoted and discussed here (see Figures 3 and 4).   
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Figure 3: Key Sectoral Impacts of Climate Change   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IPCC, WG II, 2007.   
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Figure 4: Detailed Examples of Major Impacts by Sector   
 
Phenomenona 
and direction 
of trend 
 
Likelihood 
of future 
trends 
Examples of major projected impacts by sector 
 
  Agriculture, 
forestry and 
ecosystems 
Water 
 
Human health 
 
 
Industry, 
settlements  
and society  
Over most land 
areas, warmer 
and fewer cold 
days and nights, 
warmer and 
more 
frequent hot 
days 
and nights 
 
Virtually 
certain 
 
Increased yields 
in colder 
environments; 
decreased 
yields in warmer 
environments; 
increased insect 
outbreaks 
 
Effects on water 
resources 
relying on snow 
melt; effects on 
some water 
supply 
 
Reduced 
human 
mortality from 
decreased 
cold exposure 
 
Reduced energy 
demand for 
heating; increased 
demand for 
cooling;  
reduced disruption 
to transport due to 
snow,  
ice; effects 
on winter tourism 
Warm 
spells/heat 
waves. 
Frequency 
increases over 
most land areas 
 
Very  
likely 
 
Reduced yields 
in warmer 
regions due to 
heat stress; wild 
fire danger 
increase 
 
Increased water 
demand; water 
quality 
problems, e.g., 
algal blooms 
 
Increased risk 
of heat-related 
mortality, 
esp. for the 
elderly, 
chronically 
sick, very 
young and 
socially isolated 
Reduction in 
quality of life for 
people in warm 
areas without 
appropriate 
housing; impacts 
on elderly, very 
young and poor. 
 
Heavy 
precipitation 
events. 
Frequency 
increases over 
most areas 
 
Very  
likely 
 
Damage to 
crops; soil 
erosion, inability 
to cultivate land 
due to water 
logging of soils 
 
Adverse effects 
on quality of 
surface and 
groundwater; 
contamination 
of water supply; 
water scarcity 
may be relieved 
Increased risk 
of deaths, 
injuries, 
infectious, 
respiratory and 
skin diseases 
 
Disruption of 
settlements, 
commerce, 
transport and 
societies due to 
flooding;  
pressureson  
infrastructures; 
loss of property 
Area affected by 
drought 
increases 
 
Likely 
 
Land 
degradation, 
lower 
yields/crop 
damage and 
failure; 
increased 
livestock deaths; 
increased risk of 
wildfire 
More 
widespread 
water stress 
 
Increased risk 
of food and 
water 
shortage; 
increased risk of 
malnutrition; 
increased risk of 
water- and 
food-borne 
diseases 
Water shortages 
for settlements, 
industry and 
societies; reduced 
hydropower 
generation; 
potential for 
population 
migration 
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Intense tropical 
cyclone activity 
increases 
 
Likely 
 
Damage to 
crops; windthrow 
(uprooting) of 
trees; damage to 
coral reefs 
 
Power outages 
cause 
disruption of 
public water 
supply 
 
Increased risk of 
deaths, injuries, 
water- and 
foodborne 
diseases; 
post-traumatic 
stress disorders 
 
Disruption by flood 
and 
high winds; 
withdrawal of 
risk coverage by 
private insurers, 
potential for  
migration, loss of 
property 
Increased 
incidence of 
extreme high 
sea level 
(excludes 
tsunamis) 
 
Likely 
 
Salinisation of 
irrigation water, 
estuaries and 
freshwater 
systems 
 
Decreased 
freshwater 
availability due 
to saltwater 
intrusion 
 
Increased risk of 
deaths and 
injuries by 
drowning in 
floods; 
migrationrelated 
health effects 
 
Costs of coastal 
protection 
vs. costs of land-use 
relocation; potential 
for 
movement of 
populations 
and  damage to 
infrastructure  
 
 
Source: IPCC, WG II, 2007.   
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Working Group II of IPCC is sure that the magnitudes of impacts can now 
be estimated more systematically for a range of possible increases in 
global average temperature. Whether or not such magnitudes of impacts 
could be associated with “key vulnerabilities”, however, is left open.   
In the literature, a number of criteria have been discussed - such as timing, 
persistence, distributional aspects such as justice and fairness - that make 
a respective judgement possible. Such information could become politically 
relevant in the future as it would help decision-makers in their responses to 
the specific risks (priority setting) of climate change.   
At this point in time, the regional impacts of climate change find the special 
interest of the Working Group.  
In the following, some short regional overviews shall be presented (see 
Figures 5 to 11).   
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Figures 5 to 11: Regional Impacts of Climate Change   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are projected to be
exposed to an increase of water stress due to climate change. If coupled 
with increased demand, this will adversely affect livelihoods and 
exacerbate water-related problems. Agricultural production, including
access to food, in many African countries and regions is projected to be
severely compromised.  Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents 
to climate variability and change because of multiple stresses and low 
adaptive capacity.
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Nearly all European regions are anticipated to be negatively affected by 
some future impacts of climate change and these will pose challenges 
to many economic sectors. Negative impacts will include increased risk 
of inland flash floods, and more frequent coastal flooding and increased 
erosion. The great majority of organisms and ecosystems will have 
difficulties adapting to climate change. Mountainous areas will face 
glacier retreat, reduced snow cover and winter tourism, and extensive 
species losses.
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By mid-century, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil water 
are projected to lead to gradual replacement of tropical forest by savanna in 
eastern Amazonia. Semi-arid vegetation will tend to be replaced by arid-land 
vegetation. There is a risk of significant biodiversity loss through species 
extinction in many areas of tropical Latin America.In drier areas, climate change 
is expected to lead to salinisation and desertification of agricultural land. 
Productivity of some important crops is projected to decrease and livestock 
productivity to decline,with adverse consequences for food security. In temperate 
zones soybean yields are projected to increase. 
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Warming in western mountains is projected to 
cause decreased snowpack, more winter flooding, 
and reduced summer flows, exacerbating 
competition for over-allocated water resources. 
Population growth and the rising value of 
infrastructure in coastal areas increase 
vulnerability to climate variability and future 
climate change, with losses projected to increase 
if the intensity of tropical storms increases.
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In the Polar Regions, the main projected biophysical effects are reductions in 
thickness and extent of glaciers and ice sheets, and changes in natural 
ecosystems with detrimental effects on many organisms including migratory 
birds, mammals and higher predators. In the Arctic, additional impacts 
include reductions in the extent of sea ice and permafrost, increased coastal 
erosion, and an increase in the depth of permafrost seasonal thawing. 
Despite the resilience shown historically by Arctic indigenous communities, 
some traditional ways of life are being threatened and substantial 
investments are needed to adapt or re-locate physical structures and 
communities.
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Source: Own compilations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 On the Costs of Climate Change   
Adaptation to occurring climate change or mitigation, i.e., measures to 
reduce GHG emissions and to prevent dangerous climate change? This is 
Small islands, whether located in the tropics or higher latitudes, are
especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, sea level rise and 
extreme events. Deterioration in coastal conditions is expected to affect 
local resources, e.g., fisheries, and reduce the value of these destinations 
for tourism. Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm 
surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, thus threatening vital
infrastructure, settlements and facilities that support the livelihood of 
island communities.
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not only a major issue for natural scientists. It is also an issue for 
economists and social scientists. With great vigour and expertise, Sir 
Nicholas Stern and colleagues have tried to answer two major questions:   
1. What impacts will future greenhouse gas emissions have and what 
will they cost?   
2. What are the costs and benefits of measures to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases?   
To determine the impacts of climate change in economic terms is - as the 
authors rightly observe - a “real challenge”. Monetary evaluations of such 
heterogeneous and long-term changes are compound with a huge number 
of methodological and ethical questions. How to evaluate, for instance, the 
increased number of deaths and injuries when addressing climate change? 
What are the costs and benefits today, compared with those in the year 
2100? The discount-rate plays a major role to determine these estimations.   
It would certainly be worthwhile to discuss the Stern-Report in great detail. 
This, however, is not possible here. Instead, I shall heroicly assume that 
the issues of evaluation are known to the audience. Also, the results of the 
Stern-Report can only be summarised shortly:   
1. The overall economic costs of climate change will be equivalent to 
losing at least 5 % of global gross domestic product (GDP), now and 
for ever.   
2. Taking the impacts on ecosystems and human health into 
consideration leads to a dimension of 11 %.   
3. Additionally considering possible feed backs and regional transfers 
due to differing impacts, the estimates of damage rise to 20 % of 
global GDP, or more.   
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The costs of an unrestrained climate change thus may be on a scale of 5 to 
20 % of gross global product – according to Stern probably at the upper 
end.   
(To illustrate this dimension, Stern uses a comparison with the costs of the 
two world wars and the world economic crisis of the 1920s).   
The alternative to these huge damages of climate change are, of course, 
the costs of action, i.e. those measures with which the emission of 
greenhouse gases could be reduced to avoid the worst impacts of climate 
change.   
Two assumptions play a major role here: (1) The absorption capacity of the 
natural ecosystems is estimated at 5 GtCO2 per year. (2) To stabilise the 
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere at 450 ppm, the further increase of 
emissions would have to be stopped within the next 10 years, and reduced 
thereafter by 5 % annually; this, according to Stern et al. seems to be 
already out of reach. For a stabilisation at 550 ppm, this rate would have to 
be in the range of 1 to 3 % annually. Weak action in the next 10-20 years 
would put stabilisation even at 550 ppm beyond reach.   
Four groups of measures are discussed to attain these goals:   
1. Reducing demand for energy-intensive products and services;  
2. drastic increase of energy efficiency;  
3. curbing deforestation;  
4. transition from fossil to non-fossil energy sources.   
Stern et al. found that the costs for stabilisation of CO2-concentration in the 
atmosphere at 500 - 550 ppm were centered on 1 % of global GDP by 
2050.   
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Conclusion: The costs of an effective climate policy are much less than the 
costs of non-action. And: The later a strong climate policy is enforced, the 
more costly it will become.   
The second part of the Stern-Report addresses the question of what kind of 
policies may best initiate the necessary paradigm shift. Three essential 
elements of a future climate policy are being discussed in detail: carbon 
pricing, technology policy, and removal of barriers to behavioural change. 
More specifically:   
1. CO2 emissions must have a price – be it through emissions trading, 
emission taxes or regulatory arrangements.   
2. CO2-free technologies of energy generation must be stimulated to 
reach competitive status, both in supply and in prises.   
3. Restrictive behaviour patterns must be removed, particularly by 
introducing high energy efficiency standards, information on 
excessive energy consumption and possibilities of better energy 
use.   
These elements of the Stern-Report already indicate that climate policy, in 
actual fact, is global policy. Strong collective action is needed, and should 
start right now. With this understanding, we have reached the final theme, 
namely to look at “Kyoto I” and “Kyoto II”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 9
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 From Kyoto I to Kyoto II (III)   
The “Kyoto Protocol” of 1997 which came into force in 2005, so far is the 
only implementation instrument under the UN-Framework Convention on 
Kyoto I   (1997 / 2005 – 2008 / 2012)
Target: 
? Reduction of Greenhouse Gases by 35 States
(and EU) by 5,2 % (over 1990)  
Economic Mechanisms:  
? JI:       Joint Implementation  
? CDM: Clean Development Mechanism  
? ET:       Emissions Trading  (regional)  
Compliance: 
? Relative Sanction on Missing Target 
Incentives: 
? Global Environment Fund (GEF); Special Climate Fund; 
? Adaptation Fund; LDC- Fund  
 
 
3 0
Climate Change. It will end in the year 2012. Therefore, time has come, to 
negotiate Kyoto II, and to reflect on Kyoto III.   
To start with, the Kyoto Protocol is an extremely important treaty under 
international law, addressing the reduction of six specified greenhouse 
gases. There is no real alternative to a multi-lateral approach of climate 
policy. Also, the Kyoto Protocol is a treaty with highly innovative economic 
mechanisms. At the same time, however, it is, in its present form, a rather 
weak treaty.   
This so for three major reasons: (1) The target is not very ambitious; (2) not 
enough actors (states) have been incorporated; (3) the sanctions against 
misbehaviour are insufficient.   
Between signing (1997) and coming into force (2005), another structural 
deficit of the Kyoto Protocol was overcome, but only partly so. There still is 
no adequate balance between incentives and sanctions - between “the 
carrot and the stick”. Learning from the “Montreal Protocol”, where such 
balance was struck in an exemplary fashion, did not take place.   
But to be honest: The CDM mechanism which is operating since about two 
years has led to some 1.200 emission reduction projects between industrial 
and developing countries, with a potential for emission reduction of some 
1.5 billion tons of CO2 until the year 2012. The JI-mechanism which is in 
effect since several months has a reduction potential of a few hundred 
million tons. The potential of the ET-mechanism is theoretically enormous, 
depending however on strict, politically set caps (emission limits) and the 
actual emission certificate price – which in reality can be high or low.   
The various climate funds established in recent years may be sufficient to 
cover information and communication costs. But for effectively addressing 
adaptation to climate change and mitigation of dangerous emission levels, 
they are absolutely insufficient.   
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All these mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol therefore need re-adjustment. 
The CDM has nearly no effect in Africa, but is booming in China. The JI 
needs an efficiency philosophy which so far does not exist in most of the 
countries involved (particularly Eastern Europe). The ET mechanism 
established in Europe is poorly conceptualised, and there is none yet in the 
regions of Northern America or Eastern Asia.   
In addition, there is the question whether the economic mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol need not be amended. In their steering functions, all 
national policies depend on different strategic instruments. There is no 
reason why this should not also hold true for international climate policy.   
In the literature on global environmental problems, quantity solutions (like 
emission certificates) and price solutions (like taxes and levies) are 
basically treated as being equivalent. And regarding price solutions, the 
proposals are many: levies on the use of global public goods (air and sea 
transport), a general CO2 tax, etc. However, what is theoretically advisable, 
and practically required, is often confronted by particular interests.  And so 
the question is, whether an updated classic (Meadows et al.), a fascinating 
film (Al Gore), a comprehensive report (Stern et al.) and a cool assessment 
(IPCC) will really make a difference.   
This said, we have already touched the essentials for a “Kyoto II”: (1) The 
targets must be heightened; (2) the number of actors enlarged; (3) the 
mechanisms augmented; (4) the sanctions tightened; (5) the incentives 
amplified.   
Hereby, an important question is whether a consensus can be reached on 
a concrete warming target. The German Advisory Council on Global 
Change (WBGU) first proposed a strict upper limit of 2°C of temperature 
increase (which corresponds to a CO2-concentration of about 450 ppm); 
others meanwhile have joined. The basic rationale of this proposal: A 
global average warming of above 2°C can only be described as being 
“dangerous”.   
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With “Kyoto II” we mean a new implementation treaty to the UN-Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for the time from 2012 
onwards. To be honest, this treaty may not be signed in Kyoto (Japan), 
after all. Depending on the outcome of current diplomatic initiatives by the 
Danes, it might be signed at the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
Convention in Copenhagen (Denmark) in 2009. In addition to this possible 
milestone of future climate policy there is, as was said earlier, the question 
of the perspectives for the time after 2020/25 and up to 2050 (“Kyoto III”), 
the period on which climate policy concepts must be focussed, as climate 
science is anyway.   
Annotation   
At this point, a commentary must be given. The UN-Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol symbolise, in essence, a 
technical path to climate protection - or the “Energy Option”. Targets, 
instruments and strategy are focussed in a peculiar way on energy related 
greenhouse gas emissions. The climate system, however, is also 
influenced by changes in other natural systems, particularly vegetation, 
forests, and water. Therefore, it is necessary and adequate to also address 
the natural path to climate protection – especially the “Forest Option”, i.e. 
the conservation of forests, sustainable forest management, reforestation 
and afforestation. This option however is excluded from the present 
argumentation, as it was addressed earlier by the author in a special paper 
(Simonis, 2007).  
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Source: Own compilation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Formulating a Technology Protocol   
Seen physically, the Kyoto Protocol (“Kyoto I, II, III”) is mainly on 
decarbonisation, more precisely: on formulating and implementing certain 
international decarbonisation standards. The Earth system, however, is not 
Kyoto II / III   (2012 – 2020/25 – 2050)
Target: 
? Reduction of Greenhouse Gases by 35 + (!) States
(and EU) by   25/30 %  -  50 %
Additional Economic Mechanisms:  
? Levy on the Use of  Global Goods
(like Air Transport, Sea Transport)  
? General CO2-Tax  
? Global Emissions Trading 
Compliance: 
? Decarbonisation-Standards; Absolute Sanction
on Missing Target  
Incentives: 
? ET- or Tax-based Climate Fund 
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only endangered by CO2 emissions. The industrial metabolism as such is 
exorbitantly high, particularly material throughput; and with it the 
“Ecological Rucksack” of industrial society.   
For instance, the CO2 burden of the average European is above 9 tons per 
year, but the total material throughput (TMT) is nearly 70 tons. Therefore, 
mitigation via “low emission technology” should be supplemented by 
mitigation via “resource-light economy”. Dematerialisation is also asked for 
– or, as a recent proverb says: “Less horsepower, more IQ!”. 
Here, a number of strategic technological mechanisms or mitigation 
portfolios come into picture, of which quite a few are addressed in the 
report of Working Group III of IPCC. Key mitigation technologies and 
practices could be the following ones:   
- The three e’s: Energy Saving; Energy Efficiency; Renewable Energies;  
- the three r’s: Reduce; Re-use; recycle;  
- the big s: CO2-sequestration;  
- the basic ie: Industrial ecology.   
Quite a few of those who mistrust or even refuse multi-lateral approaches 
to climate change and international law – and with it the Kyoto Protocol – 
play the “technology card”, propose so called lighthouse projects, an 
‘Apollo program’ or strategic innovation policy – like hydrogen economy, 
CO2-sequestration or large-scale renewable energies. An offer should be 
made to these actors and interest groups, especially when in this way a 
new and dynamic cooperation on international climate protection 
technology would emerge.   
Basically, the UN-Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
allows more than just one implementation protocol. That means, it is 
neither necessary nor particularly clever to base international climate policy 
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on just one market oriented protocol – the Kyoto Protocol. A technology 
oriented protocol could also and additionally be conceptualised under the 
UN-Climate Convention. This, preferably, should be done where major 
opponents to the Kyoto Protocol can be located – for instance, in Houston, 
Texas.   
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Source: Own compilation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'Houston-Protocol' (2012 – 2020/25 – 2050)
Target: 
? Low Emission Technology; Resource-light
Economy
Technological Mechanisms:  
? 3 e’s: Energy Saving; Energy Efficiency; 
Renewable Energies  
? 3 r’s: Reduce; Re-use; Recycle  
? Big s: CO2-Sequestration  
? Great ie: Industrial Ecology  
Compliance: 
? Dematerialisation-Standards; ‚Front-Runner’ Principle;
? 'Zero-Emission' Principle
Incentives: 
? Technology Transfers; PPPs; Factor- 4, Factor-10-Funds 
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With such a “double strategy” - improving the Kyoto Protocol (“Kyoto II”) 
and formulating a Technology Protocol (“Houston Protocol”) - two goals 
could be achieved at the same time: getting in the so far opposing or 
boycotting parties, and making national “free-riders” responsible for 
international action.   
Regarding the sanction and incentive mechanisms of such an international 
technology treaty, basic principles could be introduced which have proven 
to be technologically innovative, the “front-runner” and the “zero-emission 
principle”, for instance, and the “Factor 4-” and the “Factor 10-concept”. In 
addition, special consideration should be given to a flexible handling of 
patent law, which otherwise could prevent the breakthrough towards 
international climate technology cooperation.   
7 Last but not least: Institutional Innovations   
There is another great idea that could be important for our topic. Parallel to 
the presentation of the first part of the 4th IPCC assessment report on 2nd 
February, 2007, the French President had invited to an environment 
conference in Paris. In a glowing speech, Jacques Chirac was pleading for 
a revolution – a revolution of consciousness, of the economy, and of 
political action (la revolution des consciences; la revolution de l’economie; 
la revolution de l’action politique). “Planet Earth suffers”, the President said. 
“But why do we hesitate to take action? It is that we refuse, due to guilty 
egoism, to accept the consequences of environmental destruction.”   
A great institutional reform could come close to such revolution of political 
action: the transformation of the rather weak and poorly endowed United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) into a powerful Global 
Environment Organisation (GEO) - or a World Environment and 
Development Organisation (WEDO).   
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Source: Own compilation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Institutional Reform
Cooperation: 
? UN-Conventions
(Climate, Biodiversity, Deserts, Chemicals)
Addition: 
? UN-Soils-, Water- and Forest Conventions 
?  
Integration:
? UNEP (+) >>> GEO
? UNEP (+) >>> WEDO   
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This, indeed, could be a strategically important innovation. Not only for 
future international climate policy. Also, the coordination of the other 
sectoral policies is in need of better institutionalisation within the UN-
system. The conservation of biodiversity, of forests, the protection of soils, 
the safeguard of water resources – all these global tasks are influenced by 
climate change and are in a feed-back loop with this change. Using 
cooperation, addition and integration to come to a coherent global 
environmental policy (”Weltumweltpolitik” - Simonis) therefore seems to be 
a major political task of the future.   
Institutional reform, based on fairness and equity, is not only important for 
saving the climate system. It is also necessary because of the fact that the 
short-term economic interests must be balanced with the long-term 
ecological interests. This, however, is impossible as long as there is a 
World Bank (WB) and a World Trade Organisation (WTO), but no World 
Environment Organisation (GEO/WEDO).   
Parity – it seems – is the minimum that must be achieved. Especially, if Sir 
Nicholas Stern is right in saying that “climate change is the greatest market 
failure the world has ever seen”.   
International climate policy needs a new dynamics. It needs front-runners 
and after-burners. It needs progress without taking notice of possible 
profiteers of decline. This seems possible if all major actors –governments, 
business, academia, and civil society – not only accept the reality of climate 
change, but also the responsibility for it.   
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